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 There is a critical strand of literature suggesting that there 
are no ‘natural’ disasters (Abramovitz, 2001; Anderson and 
Woodrow, 1998; Clarke, 2008; Hinchliffe, 2004).  There are 
only those that leave us – the people - more or less shaken and 
disturbed.    There may be some substance to this; for example, 
how many readers recall the 7.8 magnitude earthquake centred 
in Fiordland in July 2009?  Because it was so far away from a 
major centre and very few people suffered any consequences, 
the number is likely to be far fewer than those who remember 
(all too vividly) the relatively smaller 7.1 magnitude Canterbury 
quake of September 4th 2010 and the more recent 6.3 magni-
tude February 22nd 2011 event. 
One implication of this construction of disasters is that seismic 
events, like those in Canterbury, are as much socio-political as 
they are geological.  Yet, as this paper shows, the temptation in 
recovery is to tick boxes and rebuild rather than recover, and 
to focus on hard infrastructure rather than civic expertise and 
community involvement.  In this paper I draw upon different 
models of community engagement and use Putnam’s (1995) 
notion of ‘social capital’ to frame the argument that ‘building 
bridges’ after a disaster is a complex blend of engineering, com-
munication and collaboration.  I then present the results of a 
qualitative research project undertaken after the September 4th 
earthquake.  This research helps to illustrate the important con-
nections between technical rebuilding, social capital, recovery 
processes and overall urban resilience. 
Community engagement and recovery
It is now well-established in the literature that communities 
have an important role to play in recovery processes following 
a ‘natural’ disaster (Norman, 2004; Hauser, Sherry and Swartz, 
2008; Coles and Buckle, 2004; Jilali, 2002; Murphy, 2007; Waugh 
and Streib, 2006; Aldrich, 2011).  As the Canterbury Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management Group Plan (2005-2010, 
section 9, p. 8) states: 
Community involvement is an important aspect of Re-
covery. It is the means whereby those directly affected by 
the event help rebuild their own facilities and services. 
Community involvement provides a framework for re-
establishing the economic, social, emotional and physical 
well-being of the affected population. The benefit of using 
community resources is twofold. Firstly, local agencies 
know the community make-up and requirements better 
than any outside organisation. Secondly, affected people 
have an inherent need to rebuild. Using this resource 
wisely can lead to a stronger, more resilient and united 
community. (www.cdemcanterbury.govt.nz/cdem-group-
plan-downloads.html)
Community involvement and engagement can take many 
forms, ranging from simple information provision at one ex-
treme to co-management at the other.  Different labels are given 
to the various stages along this continuum (see, for example, the 
IAP2 spectrum of participation at www.iap2.org), however the 
names essentially reflect the extent to which a) communication 
can be seen as a two-way process and b) the way decision-mak-
ing powers are shared between those with some official interest 
in recovery (such as the CCC, EQC (see Figure 1 which gives an 
overview of some methods I have seen used in the past in New 
Zealand and the Philippines) and community groups.
Community involvement after a disaster is complicated by the 
intensity, variety and scale of needs, and by the range of actors 
suddenly compelled to become involved in recovery processes.  
Local politics - usually a game for the ‘usual suspects’ - becomes 
a considerably more complex, heated and frustrating endeav-
our.  This is exacerbated by lengthy timeframes, rumour and, 
of course, the trauma of the event itself.  This raises questions 
about the nature of ‘recovery’ and what that might mean.
Figure 1. Participation and engagement.
Social capital, recovery and resilience
According to the CDEM Group Plan (2005-2010, section 9, p. 
1):
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…recovery is a developmental and remedial process 
with the main objective of efficiently organising avail-
able resources to restore communities to the point where 
normal social and economic activities resume….[It is the] 
coordinated efforts and processes to effect the immediate, 
medium and long-term holistic regeneration of a commu-
nity following a disaster (www.cdemcanterbury.govt.nz/
cdem-group-plan-downloads).
Importantly, this definition does not privilege the repair and 
rebuilding of hard infrastructure over other community needs, 
some of which are amorphous and difficult to identify, much 
less address.  Despite these difficulties, this recovery period can 
also be regarded as a time when a range of new opportunities 
are presented.  Disasters throw open a new range of possibilities 
and it is often a time when civic consciousness is particularly 
strong (Shaw and Goda, 2004).  There is a fine line between 
disasters and opportunity for, as Lorenz (2010, n.p.) has argued, 
sudden and dramatic change that ‘only becomes a crisis when 
fundamental expectations addressed to the present or future are 
at stake, and a disaster ensues if and only if these expectations 
can no longer be fulfilled’.  Conversely, change can be a positive 
force if it allows for developments that exceed our hopes and 
expectations.  Napier’s post-1931 earthquake Spanish mission 
or Art Deco style reconstruction (see John, 2006) is a good 
example of the way a strong recovery vision can turn disaster 
into success.
The extent to which these opportunities are developed depends 
on a range of factors, some of which are technical ability and ex-
pertise; however, there has recently been a resurgence of interest 
in Putnam’s (1995) work on ‘social capital’ and the way it relates 
to recovery and resilience (Lorenz, 2010; Murphy, 2007; Walker 
and Salt, 2006; Newman, Beatley and Boyer, 2009; Pelling and 
High, 2005; Boettke et al, 2007).  Putnam’s work – where social 
capital is positively associated with civil society, networks, 
norms and trust – is based on the recognition of strong and 
weak social relationships.  These relationships may be used to 
bond a group together; bridge groups with similar interests; link 
groups vertically in formal institutional arrangements; or brace 
between public and private sectors (see Murphy, 2007, Walker 
and Salt, 2006; Pelling and High, 2005; Rydin and Holman, 
2004).  Establishing and maintaining these different types of 
social capital is important in terms of recovery, particularly in 
terms of knowledge transfer and, building trust and develop-
ing a common language across laypeople and experts (Rydin, 
2006).  Olsson et al. (2006) use the terms ‘leaders’ and ‘shadow 
networks’ instead of social capital but they are similar concepts.  
They argue that leaders (linking capital) are needed to prepare a 
system for change by devising alternatives, developing strate-
gies, seizing opportunities and assembling shadow networks 
(bridging, bonding and bracing) that work across different 
scales.  These shadow networks can play an important role in 
both preserving traditional understanding of one’s environ-
ment and in providing socio-ecological feedback loops; that is, 
identifying and communicating problems before thresholds are 
breached (Folke, Carpenter, Elmqvist, Gunderson, Holling, and 
Walker, 2002).
It is this complex network of social capital that makes a city 
resilient.  Resilience has three related definitions.  The first sup-
poses an ideal ‘steady-state’ or equilibrium to which a system 
‘bounces back’ following a disturbance.  The second relates to 
the extent to which a system is able to self-organise.  The third 
recognises a system may have multiple stable states and that 
being able to bounce back to normal might be less important – 
and even less ideal - than the ability to adapt to new conditions 
(i.e., its ‘adaptive capacity’).  The adaptive capacity of a socio-
ecological system thus refers to our ability to cope with change 
by observing, learning and then modifying the way we interact 
with the world around us, over different geographic scales.  
When applied to a city after a disaster, one might say resilience 
is the ability to restore essential functions and use the opportu-
nities presented to avoid future disasters.  
Despite a general literary consensus that social capital is 
somehow important to a robust recovery and a resilient society, 
unresolved questions still swirl around why that should be, 
and how we might foster ‘social capital’ under times of stress.  
This research has looked for answers to these questions based 
on approximately 50 in-depth interviews with Christchurch 
residents, City Councillors and Community Board Members, 
MPs, and representatives from community groups, Citycare, 
the Earthquake Commission, engineering firms, the District 
Health Board and several small businesses.  The interviews with 
residents were conducted between October 2010 and February 
2011 and usually began with the interviewee’s recollection of 
the first earthquake and followed with their assessment of the 
recovery process.1 
Results: 
In an age of globalisation, increased mobility, and technology 
that enables people to be ‘closer’ to their chat room buddies 
than their neighbours, it has become rather commonplace to 
question the relevance of geography and, in particular, the 
utility of place-based communities.  While the notion of ‘com-
munity’ does remain problematic, the Canterbury earthquake 
has shown that when the power is out, the computer no longer 
works and your cell phone battery is running low, geography 
matters.  In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, in the 
dark and the cold, neighbours played a vital role in framing the 
event – that is, making sense of it - and developing an initial, 
grassroots response.  Street level caring and sharing took many 
forms: cooking breakfast and making cups of tea for others 
on their barbeque, dismantling trembling chimneys, securing 
homes and digging exit paths through the slushy, smelly mud 
volcanoes caused by liquefaction.  But perhaps the greatest 
comfort came through the face-to-face sharing of information 
about where to get water, how to boil it, which food outlets were 
open, and the thing no-one wants to talk about, ‘where to poo’. 
Along with the more salubrious services – water, food, housing 
– sewers are a vital component of a well-functioning city and 
unfortunately, the earthquakes left many homes in certain parts 
of Christchurch without this basic provision.  Restoring this 
important function may seem at first a technical matter, but sev-
eral incidents show the pitfalls of seeing infrastructure in this 
way.  One of these concerns the way functional sewer connec-
tions became part of the ‘sticker scheme’, issued under the Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Act, that determined whether 
a house was unsafe (red), safe but uninhabitable due to a lack of 
1 This research had approval from the Lincoln Univer-
sity Human Ethics Committee.
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water or sewer connection (yellow), or fully functional (green).  
These stickers, while intended as a guide to a dwelling’s state 
of (dis)repair, were subsequently used to inform rates rebates 
and financial grants.  The accuracy of the stickers therefore had 
consequences that extended well beyond their original technical 
purpose. 
The state, location, and carrying capacity of the sewers in 
badly affected suburbs also caused much confusion.  There was  
constant adjustment and readjustment of functionality as some 
sewers were repaired only to cause a blockage elsewhere.  Again, 
this seemingly technical matter – whether a particular section 
of sewer had  ‘full’, ‘low’ or ‘no’ flow- caused a range of anxieties. 
As one interviewee told me:
They [the Christchurch City Council (CCC)] keep telling 
me I’ve got ‘low’ flow but that’s not right…I’ve got no flow 
really because when I flush it bubbles up in my neighbour’s 
back yard…now I’m not about to… take a dump on my 
neighbour’s lawn am I? 
The full-, low- and no-flow scheme was also used to determine 
whether or not a portaloo would be provided.  As one inter-
viewee told me in an email dated November 5, 2010:
Yesterday a truck turned up outside quite a number of 
properties to remove “un-needed” Portaloos …We phoned 
the CCC yesterday and again gave the names and numbers 
of those that needed them because they had no sewerage 
at all and those that didn’t need them because they had a 
tank. But today I got a phone call from the CCC to make 
sure I still needed a Portaloo today. I said yes nothing had 
changed overnight. She then told me that I would be the 
only one in the street with one as no one else needed one.  
There was an ongoing discussion that involved quite a bit 
of anger and abruptness on my part I must confess – the 
outcome was that I had no authority to seek a Portaloo 
for my neighbours and they weren’t on “the list” – al-
though they were on the a “list” yesterday etc…  I told my 
neighbour she better call to advise that she still needed a 
Portaloo.  After a long discussion in which she was advised 
she wasn’t on the list and so didn’t need one the dreaded 
Portaloo truck appeared. Fearing the worst my neighbour 
rushed outside to save our dignity only to be told it was 
alright he was bringing one not taking one away. In fact he 
also brought me another one to sit beside my existing one. 
… One for each cheek maybe?
One more conflict that belies the purely technical appear-
ance of sewers centred on an apparently ‘ideal’ solution to the 
numerous blockages in the lines.  Essentially the earthquake 
lowered the ground level and left some streets without a grav-
ity feed to the main sewers.  Rectifying this would take a long 
time and prove costly, so the CCC proffered an alternative; 
individual pressurised septic tanks.  These did not necessarily 
meet people’s ‘needs’, however.  There was much confusion over 
the capacity of the tanks, concern as to how often they would 
be emptied and, although they were fairly unobtrusive to look 
at, people were also concerned that their house values would 
be adversely affected by this unorthodox and perhaps unreli-
able system.  Again, though the tanks appeared to offer a sound 
technical solution, because they were embedded in wider social 
configurations of capital gains, household size and aesthetics, 
the individual tanks were not a workable solution.  As a result, 
a small scale protest group convened, liaised with the CCC and 
the pressurised tanks are now considered a ‘temporary’ solu-
tion.  This raises interesting questions about the way disasters 
affect social capital and vice versa and the ways recovery, resil-
ience and reconstruction are linked.
Community, Resilience and Recovery: Building 
Bridges Within and Between
These incidents all highlight the dangers of seeing recovery as a 
technical matter, and of confining the matter to one of rebuild-
ing hard infrastructure.  Hard infrastructure, as these examples 
show, is embedded in a social context; it is part of an intricate 
but vitally important web of social relations and expectations.  
Listening to the people living within that context is, therefore, 
a necessary part of understanding what will work in a social, if 
not technical, sense.  So what have these events taught us about 
social capital, resilience and recovery?
Bonding capital:
‘Disasters’ rearrange, sometimes strengthen, but often under-
mine existing geography-based social networks.  Although 
neighbours were often the first point of contact after the earth-
quake, many residents in badly-affected areas simply left.  They 
could not or would not stay in their damaged homes and have 
not returned.  Consequently, this has fractured once-strong 
communities and ruptured established social networks and 
routines.  That said, some Christchurch citizens have done very 
well: as one example, after an initial ‘scramble’ the Canterbury 
Communities’ Earthquake Recovery Network (CanCERN) was 
formed and it has started to gain traction with various organisa-
tions like EQC, CCC and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Commission (CERC).  It has, however, been a difficult road and 
has taken an enormous amount of volunteer hours to become as 
organised as they have.  Their path could have been easier had 
more funding been provided earlier on, with resources made 
available to facilitate their attempts to self-organise.
Figure 2: CanCERN’s community engagement model (courtesy 
CanCERN)
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One idea that has worked well for CanCERN is a somewhat 
more elaborate version of the old ‘phone tree’ system (see Figure 
2), but one that is based on ‘street’ geography.  In this model, 
street coordinators communicate with both individual house-
holds and neighbourhood representatives, who then liaise with 
government and non-governmental organisations.  This works 
well because some of the issues – like pockets of liquefaction or 
failed sewer laterals – connect neighbours, streets and neigh-
bourhoods.  Such issues are resolved more quickly and more 
effectively if they are addressed holistically rather than on an 
individual household basis.  It also manages to ‘capture’ people 
who might otherwise be left out (such as those without tele-
phone or internet), and it provides a forum whereby all those 
people who suddenly have issues – and who may not be familiar 
with existing processes – can be heard.  In the wake of a disas-
ter, local authorities should do what they can to instigate this 
process of community-based recovery so that, when it is time 
to discuss rebuilding options, there is actually a body to ‘engage’ 
with.  The alternative, as one CCC representative put it, is to ‘try 
and herd cats’.
Bridging capital:
CanCERN’s efforts have been undermined, to some extent, by 
the lack of clear leadership roles that typified the September to 
February period.   As a recent Press release (http://www.stuff.
co.nz/the-press/lifestyle/mainlander/4621179/Whos-in-charge) 
pointed out, CERC, EQC, Environment Canterbury and CCC 
all have important roles to play, however, it appears that these 
responsibilities were still being negotiated 5 months on, and 
are in the process of being renegotiated post-February.  Exacer-
bating this is a lack of an established track record – a working 
relationship – between the community and the organisation 
with which residents are most familiar: the Christchurch City 
Council.  The situation is somewhat different in Waimakariri 
District where some Residents’ Association representatives have 
very good things to say about their council.  But, as one repre-
sentative pointed out ‘we already had a good relationship with 
council before the earthquake, we’re used to working with each 
other’.  This relationship, and pre-existing communication paths 
and strategies have worked to their benefit. 
This shows that building bridges in a - communication sense 
- is an essential part of recovery processes and something that 
should be undertaken as soon as possible after a disaster, before 
goodwill erodes.  On a practical level, the repairing of hard 
infrastructure can present a good opportunity to test small scale 
co-managed projects where the public is invited to participate 
actively in re-building.  As one example, about a month after the 
earthquake quite in-depth community discussions took place 
over the design and location of a replacement for the Medway 
Street bridge which had been ‘munted’ to use the ‘technical 
term’ (as Mayor Bob Parker told TVNZ reporters on the 25th 
Feb).  Now, school term one has begun, but children can no 
longer walk across the bridge to get to school, so parents drive 
them the considerably longer distance in their cars, along roads 
that are still dusty, past houses that are still cracking on tenuous 
piles.  Residents – initially quite happy to engage in discussions 
around the bridge’s future – had become increasingly disillu-
sioned with the ‘recovery’ process.  The lesson here seems to be 
to see opportunities in the rubble and seize them in order to, 
literally, build bridges with ‘the community’.       
Conclusion:
Though there is a clear consensus in the literature that social 
capital plays an important role in processes of recovery, there 
is a paucity of detailed analyses addressing ‘why’, ‘how’, and 
‘how to foster it’, particularly under stressful conditions.  This 
research shows social capital is an important part of recovery, 
and contributes to resilience, because it helps generate a holistic 
set of satisfactory outcomes, that not only meets infrastructural 
needs, but also builds all-round urban capacity.  A resilient city 
is not only able to recover from disasters but is able to actually 
seize the opportunities disasters present (and reduce risk from 
future events).  This is less about technical repair and infra-
structure (though this plays an important role) and more about 
the relationships between its parts, its people and its leaders.  
The Christchurch earthquakes have highlighted that value of 
cultivating relationships within and between as soon as pos-
sible.  This study has shown that if these relationships do not 
exist, small scale test projects are useful ways of building bridges 
that then serve the greater project.
* Suzanne is a social scientist in the Faculty of Environment, Soci-
ety and Design at Lincoln University. She has an interest in urban 
sustainability and resilience, and connecting sudden shocks - like 
earthquakes - with long emergencies including peak oil and aging 
population.
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